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We study oligopolistic competition in service markets where firms offer a service
to customers. The service quality of a firm – from the perspective of a customer –
depends on the level of congestion and the charged price. A firm can set a price
for the service offered and additionally decides on the service capacity in order to
mitigate congestion. The total profit of a firm is derived from the gained revenue
minus the capacity investment cost. Firms simultaneously set capacities and prices
in order to maximize their profit and customers subsequently choose the services with
lowest combined cost (congestion and price). For this basic model, Johari, Weintraub
and Van Roy [21] derived the first existence and uniqueness results of pure Nash
equilibria assuming mild conditions on congestion functions. Their existence proof
relies on Kakutani’s fixed-point theorem and a key assumption for the theorem to
work is that demand for service is elastic, that is, there is a smooth inverse demand
function determining the volume of customers given the effective customers’ costs.
In this paper, we consider the case of perfectly inelastic demand. This scenario ap-
plies to realistic cases where customers are not willing to drop out of the market, e.g.,
if prices are regulated by reasonable price caps. We investigate existence, uniqueness
and quality of pure Nash equilibria for models with inelastic demand and price caps.
As our main result, we show that for linear congestion cost functions, there exists
a pure Nash equilibrium. Our existence result requires a completely new proof ap-
proach compared to previous approaches, because the best-response correspondences
of firms may be empty, so that standard fixed-point arguments á la Kakutani are not
directly applicable. The approach we use is to show that the game is C-secure – a
concept introduced by Reny [27] and refined by McLennan, Monteiro and Tourky [25],
which leads to the existence of pure Nash equilibria. As our second main result, we
show uniqueness of the equilibrium. Third, we study the efficiency of the equilibrium
compared to a social optimum and show that the efficiency ratio is unbounded in
general.
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1 Introduction
We consider a model for oligopolistic capacity and price competition in service markets exhibiting
congestion effects. There is a set of firms offering a service to customers and the overall customer
utility depends on the congestion level experienced and the price charged. In addition to setting
a price, a firm can invest in installing capacity to reduce congestion. Firms compete against
each other in the market by simultaneously choosing capacity and price levels while customers
react subsequently choosing the most attractive firms (in terms of congestion- and price levels).
This model captures many aspects of realistic oligopolistic markets such as road pricing in traffic
networks (see Xiao, Yang and Han [30] and Zhang and Han [32]) and competition among WIFI-
providers or cloud computing platforms (see Acemoglu and Ozdaglar [2] and Anselmi et al. [4]).
In a landmark paper, Johari, Weintraub and Van Roy [21] (JWVR for short) studied the fun-
damental question of existence, uniqueness and worst-case quality of pure Nash equilibria for this
model. They derived several existence and uniqueness results under fairly general assumptions
on the functional form of the congestion functions. Specifically, they showed that for models
with elastic demand, a unique pure Nash equilibrium exists. The existence result is based on the
Kakutani fixed-point theorem (see [22] and the generalizations of Fan and Glicksberg [17, 19])
and crucially exploits the assumption that demand is elastic leading to non-emptyness of the
best-response correspondences of firms. For the case of inelastic demand, that is, there is a fixed
volume of customers requesting service, much less is known in terms of existence and uniqueness
of equilibria. Many works in the transportation science and algorithmic game theory community
(see, e.g., [7, 12, 13, 14, 31, 18] and [28, 8, 3, 16], respectively) assume inelastic demand and
this case is usually considered as fundamental base case. As we show in this paper, in terms of
equilibrium existence, the case of inelastic demand is much more complicated compared to the
seemingly more general case of elastic demands: the best-response correspondence may be empty
in the “inelastic case” putting standard approaches out of reach. Besides this theoretical aspect,
the case of inelastic demand is also interesting from a practical point of view as it applies to
realistic situations (such as road pricing games), where customers have already made investments
on a longer time-scale (like buying a car) so that they are not willing to opt out of the game.
1.1 Related Work
JWVR [21] derived several existence and uniqueness results for pure Nash equilibria assuming
elastic demand of customers. The elasticity is modeled by a differentiable strictly decreasing
inverse demand function. Depending on the generality of the allowed congestion cost functions,
further concavity assumptions on the inverse demand function are imposed by JWVR. The
existence proof is based on Kakutani’s fixed-point theorem which crucially exploits (together
with further convexity and compactness properties) that best-response correspondences of the
firms are non-empty.
For the model with inelastic demand – that we consider in this paper – JWVR derive an
existence result assuming homogeneous firms, that is, the cost function of every firm is equal. As
shown by JWVR, homogeneity implies that there is only one symmetric equilibrium candidate
profile. For this specific symmetric strategy profile, they directly prove stability using concavity
arguments of the best-reply correspondences. This proof technique is clearly not applicable in
the general non-homogeneous case. As already mentioned, a further difficulty stems from the
fact that one cannot directly apply standard fixed-point arguments as even a best response of a
firm might not exist.
Acemoglu, Bimpikis and Ozdaglar [1] study a capacity and price competition game assuming
that the capacities represent “hard” capacities bounding the admissible customer volume for a
firm. They observe that pure Nash equilibria do not exist and subsequently study a two-stage
model, where in the first stage firms determine capacities and in a second stage they set prices.
For this model, they investigate the existence and worst-case efficiency of equilibria (see also
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Kreps and Scheinkman [23] for earlier work on the two-stage model). Further models in which
capacities are determined centrally in order to reduce the travel cost of the resulting Wardrop
equilibria have been considered in the (bilevel) optimization community for some time already,
see [11, 24]. In a very recent work [29], Schmand, Skopalik and Schröder study existence and
inefficiency of equilibria in a network investment game in which the firms invest in edges of a
series-parallel graph (but do not directly set prices).
1.2 Our Results and Proof Techniques
We study in this paper oligopolistic capacity and price competition assuming that there is a fixed
population of customers requesting service. This assumption applies to road pricing games, where
customers usually own a car and are not willing to opt out of the game given that prices range
in realistically bounded domains. Consequently, our model allows for the possibility of a priori
upper bounds with respect to the prices set by the firms. This situation appears naturally, if
there are legislative regulations imposing a hard price cap in the market (see Correa et al. [9] and
Harks et al. [20] and further references therein). As reported in Correa et al. [9], even different
price caps for different firms is current practice in the highway market of Santiago de Chile,
where 12 different operators set tolls on different urban highways each with a unique price cap.
While firm-specific price caps generalize the model of JWVR, we impose, on the other hand,
more restrictive assumptions on the congestion functions, that is, they are assumed to be linear
with respect to the volume of customers and inverse linear with respect to the installed capacity.
As our first result, we completely characterize the structure of best-response correspondences
of firms; including the possibility of non-existence of best-replies (Theorem 3.6). Our second main
result then establishes the existence of equilibria (Theorem 4.6). For the proof we use the concept
of C-security introduced by McLennan, Monteiro and Tourky [25], which in turn resembles
ideas of Reny [27]. A strategy profile is called C-secure, if each player has a pure strategy
guaranteeing a certain utility value, even if the other players play some perturbed strategy within
a (small enough) neighbourhood. Furthermore, for each slightly perturbed strategy profile, there
is a player whose perturbed strategy can in some sense be strictly separated from her securing
strategies. Intuitively, the concept of securing strategies means that those strategies are robust
to other players’ small deviations. The main result of McLennan, Monteiro and Tourky [25]
states that a game admits an equilibrium, if every non-equilibrium profile is C-secure. It is
important to note that the concept of C-security does not rely on quasi-concavity of utility
functions nor on their continuity. With our characterization of best-response correspondences
at hand, we show that the capacity and price game with inelastic demand, linear congestion
functions and price caps is C-secure and, thus, admits pure Nash equilibria. As our third main
result, we show that there is a unique equilibrium (Theorem 5.7). The proof technique follows
the general approach as in JWVR [21], however, since our model allows for price caps, some
new ideas are required. We finally study the worst case efficiency of the unique equilibrium
compared to a natural benchmark, in which we relax the equilibrium conditions of the firms, but
not the equilibrium conditions of the customers. We show that the unique equilibrium might be
arbitrarily inefficient (Theorem 6.1).
2 Model
There is a set N = {1, . . . , n}, n ≥ 2, of firms offering a service to customers. Customers are
represented by the continuum [0, 1] (each consumer is assumed to be infinitesimally small and
represented by a number in [0, 1]) and we denote by P = {x ∈ Rn≥0|
∑
i∈N xi = 1} the standard
simplex of assignments of customers to firms.1 The effective quality of the service of firm i offered
to a customer depends on two key factors: the level of congestion ℓi(xi, zi) and the price pi ≥ 0
1All results hold for arbitrary intervals [0, d], d ∈ R≥0 by a standard scaling argument.
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charged by the firm. The congestion function ℓi(xi, zi) depends on the volume of customers xi
and the service capacity zi ≥ 0 installed. Clearly ℓi(xi, zi) grows with the volume of customers xi
to be served but decreases with the service capacity zi. If no capacity is installed, i.e. zi = 0,
we assume infinite congestion, and for the case that zi > 0, we assume that congestion depends
linearly on the volume of customers and inverse-linearly on the installed capacity, that is,
ℓi(xi, zi) =
{
aixi
zi
+ bi, for zi > 0,
∞, for zi = 0,
where ai > 0 and bi ≥ 0 are given parameters for i ∈ N . Note that the case zi = 0 can be
interpreted as if firm i is just opting out of the market and does not offer the service at all.
Each firm i additionally decides on a price pi ∈ [0, Ci] which is charged for offering service to
its customers, where Ci > 0 is a given price cap. For a capacity vector z = (z1, . . . , zn) with∑
i∈N zi > 0, i.e. the service is offered by some firms, and a price vector p = (p1, . . . , pn),
customers choose rationally the most attractive service in terms of the effective costs, that is,
congestion and price experienced. This is expressed by the Wardrop equilibrium conditions:
ci(x, z, p) := ℓi(xi, zi) + pi ≤ cj(x, z, p) := ℓj(xj , zj) + pj
holds for all i, j ∈ N with xi > 0. Note that for given capacities z 6= 0 and prices p, there is
exactly one x ∈ P satisfying the Wardrop equilibrium conditions (see, e.g., [10]). Call this flow
x = x(z, p) the Wardrop flow induced by (z, p). In particular, there exists a constant K ≥ 0 such
that ci(x, z, p) = K holds for each i ∈ N with xi > 0, and ci(x, z, p) ≥ K holds for each i ∈ N
with xi = 0. For a Wardrop flow x, we call the corresponding constant K the (routing) cost of x.
If we denote the per-unit cost of installed capacity by γi > 0, i ∈ N , the profit function of a
firm i ∈ N can now be represented as
Πi(z, p) =
{
pixi(z, p)− γizi, for
∑
i∈N zi > 0,
0, else.
We assume that each firm i seeks to maximize her own profit. For each firm i ∈ N , let Si :=
{si = (zi, pi) : 0 ≤ zi, 0 ≤ pi ≤ Ci} be the strategy set. A vector s consisting of strategies
si = (zi, pi) ∈ Si, i ∈ N is called a strategy profile, and S :=
∏
i∈N Si denotes the set of strategy
profiles. We will usually write a strategy profile s ∈ S in the form s = (z, p), where z denotes the
vector consisting of all capacities zi for i ∈ N , and p is the vector of prices pi for i ∈ N . The profit
of firm i for a strategy profile s = (z, p) is then defined as Πi(s) := Πi(z, p). Furthermore, we write
x(s) := x(z, p) for the Wardrop-flow induced by s = (z, p) and K(s) := K(z, p) for the routing
cost of x(s). For firm i, denote by s−i = (z−i, p−i) ∈ S−i :=
∏
j∈N\{i} Sj the vector consisting
of strategies sj = (zj , pj) ∈ Sj, j ∈ N \ {i}. We then write (si, s−i) = ((zi, pi), (z−i, p−i))
for the strategy profile where firm i chooses si = (zi, pi) ∈ Si, and the other firms choose
s−i = (z−i, p−i) ∈ S−i. Moreover, we use the simplified notation Πi((si, s−i)) = Πi(si, s−i) and
x((si, s−i)) = x(si, s−i). A strategy profile s = (si, s−i) is a pure Nash equilibrium (PNE) of the
thus defined capacity and price competition game, if for each firm i ∈ N :
Πi(si, s−i) ≥ Πi(s′i, s−i) for all s′i ∈ Si.
For given strategies s−i ∈ S−i of the other firms, the best-response correspondence of firm i is
defined as
BRi(s−i) := argmax{Πi(si, s−i)|si ∈ Si}.
If s−i is clear from the context, we just write BRi.
We conclude this section with the following fundamental result about the continuity of the
profit functions. We will use Theorem 2.1, which completely characterizes the strategy profiles s
having the property that all profit functions Πi, i ∈ N , are continuous in s, several times during
the rest of the paper.
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Theorem 2.1. Let s = (z, p) ∈ S. Then: All profit functions Πi, i ∈ N , are continuous in
s = (z, p) if and only if z 6= 0 or (z, p) = (0, 0).
Proof. We start with the strategy profile s = (z, p) = (0, 0) and show that for each firm i, her
profit function Πi is continuous in s. Let i ∈ N . For ε > 0, define δ := min{ ε2γ , ε2} and let s′ ∈ S
with ||s′|| = ||s′ − s|| < δ. If z′i = 0, then Πi(s′) = Πi(s) = 0. Otherwise,
|Πi(s′)−Πi(s)| = |xi(s′)p′i − γiz′i| ≤ xi(s′)p′i + γiz′i ≤ p′i + γiz′i < δ(1 + γi) ≤ ε
holds, showing that Πi is continuous in s.
Now consider s = (z, p) ∈ S with z 6= 0. We again need to show that all profit functions Πi,
i ∈ N , are continuous in s. Since z 6= 0, we get that N+ := {j ∈ N : zj > 0} 6= ∅. Furthermore,
for δ1 > 0 sufficiently small, N+ ⊆ {j ∈ N : z′j > 0} =: N+(s′) holds for all s′ = (z′, p′) ∈ S
with ||s − s′|| < δ1. Write s′ = (s′1, s′2) ∈ S, where s′1 denotes the strategies of the firms in N+,
and s′2 denotes the strategies of the firms in N \N+.
Now let i ∈ N . We need to show that Πi is continuous in s = (z, p). For all s′ ∈ S with
||s − s′|| < δ1, firm i’s profit is Πi(s′) = xi(s′)p′i − γiz′i. Thus it is sufficient to show that xi is
continuous in s = (s1, s2). The idea of the proof is to show that, for a slightly perturbed strategy
profile (s′1, s
′
2), the difference between xi(s) and xi(s
′
1, s2), as well as the difference between
xi(s
′
1, s2) and xi(s
′
1, s
′
2), is small.
In the following, let s′ ∈ S with ||s − s′|| < δ1. It is well known ([5]) that x(s′) is the unique
optimal solution of the following optimization problem Q = Q(s′):
(Q) min
∑
j∈N
∫ xj
0
(
ℓj(t, z
′
j) + p
′
j
)
dt s.t.
∑
j∈N
xj = 1, xj ≥ 0 ∀j ∈ N.
Furthermore, xj(s′) = 0 for j /∈ N+(s′). Therefore, the values (xj(s′))j∈N+(s′) are the unique
optimal solution of
min
∑
j∈N+(s′)
∫ xj
0
(
aj
z′j
t+ bj + p
′
j
)
dt s.t.
∑
j∈N+(s′)
xj = 1, xj ≥ 0 ∀j ∈ N+(s′),
which is equivalent to
max−
∑
j∈N+(s′)
(
aj
2z′j
x2j + (bj + p
′
j)xj
)
s.t.
∑
j∈N+(s′)
xj = 1, xj ≥ 0 ∀j ∈ N+(s′).
By Berge’s theorem of the maximum [6], for all ε > 0 there is 0 < δ = δ2(ε) < δ1 such that
||x(s)− x(s′1, s2)|| < ε for all (s′1, s2) ∈ S with ||s− (s′1, s2)|| < δ. That is, x is continuous in s if
we only allow changes in s1, but not in s2. Furthermore, if q(s′) denotes the optimal objective
function value of Q(s′), and if only changes in s1 are allowed, q also is continuous in s, i.e. for
all ε > 0 there is 0 < δ = δ3(ε) < δ1 such that |q(s) − q(s′1, s2)| < ε for all (s′1, s2) ∈ S with
||s− (s′1, s2)|| < δ.
We now distinguish between the two cases that zi > 0 or zi = 0.
First consider the case zi = 0, that is, i /∈ N+, and let ε > 0. Note that xi(s) = 0, thus we
need to find δ > 0 such that |xi(s)− xi(s′)| = xi(s′) < ε for all s′ ∈ S with ||s− s′|| < δ. To this
end, define
δ = δ(i, ε) :=
{
δ3(1), if q(s) + 1 ≤ biε,
min{δ3(1), aiε22(q(s)+1−biε)}, else,
and let s′ ∈ S′ with ||s − s′|| < δ. In particular, |zi − z′i| = z′i < δ. Furthermore, q(s′) ≤
q(s′1, s2) ≤ q(s) + 1 holds since ||s − (s′1, s2)|| ≤ ||s′ − s|| < δ ≤ δ3(1). If z′i = 0, we immediately
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get xi(s′) = 0 < ε. Thus assume z′i > 0 and assume, by contradiction, that xi(s
′) ≥ ε. Then, by
definition of δ, we get the following contradiction:
q(s) + 1 ≥ q(s′) ≥ ai
2z′i
xi(s
′)2 + (bi + p′i)xi(s
′) ≥ ai
2z′i
ε2 + biε >
ai
2δ
ε2 + biε ≥ q(s) + 1.
Therefore, xi(s′) ≤ ε holds, showing that xi is continuous in s if i /∈ N+.
Now consider the case i ∈ N , i.e. zi > 0. For ε > 0, we need to find δ > 0 such that
|xi(s)− xi(s′)| < ε for all s′ ∈ S with ||s− s′|| < δ. To this end, define
δ := min{min{δ(j, ε
2n
) : j /∈ N+}, δ2(ε
2
)}
and let s′ ∈ S with ||s−s′|| < δ. In particular, ||s−(s′1, s2)|| < δ < δ2( ε2), thus |xi(s)−xi(s′1, s2)| <
ε/2. Furthermore, since δ ≤ δ(j, ε/(2n)), we get xj(s′) ≤ ε2n for all j /∈ N+. If xj(s′) = 0 for all
j /∈ N+, we get xi(s′) = xi(s′1, s2) and thus |xi(s) − xi(s′)| = |xi(s) − xi(s′1, s2)| < ε/2 < ε, as
desired. Otherwise, there is j ∈ N+ with 0 < xj(s′) ≤ ε2n . In particular, z′j > 0. We now use
a result about the sensitivity of Wardrop equilibria due to Englert et al. [15, Theorem 2]. They
show that if firm j is deleted from the game, the resulting change in the Wardrop flow can be
bounded by the flow that j received. More formally, if x ∈ [0, 1]n is the Wardrop flow for the
game with firms N , and x′ ∈ [0, 1]n−1 is the Wardrop flow if firm j is deleted from the game,
then |xk − x′k| < xj for all k ∈ N \ {j}. Obviously, changing firm j’s capacity from z′j > 0 to
zj = 0 has the same effect on the Wardrop flow as deleting firm j. Therefore, if we change, one
after another, the capacities of all firms j ∈ N+ having z′j > 0 to zj = 0, we get (note that the
flow values for j ∈ N+ can always be always upper-bounded by ε/(2n)):
|xi(s′)− xi(s′1, s2)| ≤ (n− 1)
ε
2n
<
ε
2
.
Using this, we now get the desired inequality:
|xi(s)− xi(s′)| ≤ |xi(s′)− xi(s′1, s2)|+ |xi(s)− xi(s′1, s2)| <
ε
2
+
ε
2
= ε.
Altogether we showed that all profit functions Πi are continuous at s = (z, p) if z 6= 0.
To complete the proof, it remains to show that if all profit functions Πi, i ∈ N , are continuous
in s = (z, p), then z 6= 0 or (z, p) = (0, 0) holds. We show this by contraposititon, thus assume
that s = (z, p) fulfills z = 0 and p 6= 0. We need to show that there is a firm i such that Πi is not
continuous in s. To this end, let i ∈ N with pi > 0. Define the sequence of strategy profiles sn
by (znj , p
n
j ) := (zj , pj) for all j 6= i, and (zni , pni ) := ( 1n , pi). Obviously, sn → s for n → ∞. But
for the profits, we get
Πi(s
n) = xi(s
n)pni − γizni = pi −
γi
n
→n→∞ pi > 0.
Since Πi(s) = 0, this shows that Πi is not continuous in s.
3 Characterization of Best Responses
The aim of this section is to derive a complete characterization of the best-response correspon-
dences of the firms. We will make use of this characterization in all our main results, i.e. existence,
uniqueness and quality of PNE.
Given a firm i ∈ N and fixed strategies s−i = (z−i, p−i) ∈ S−i for the other firms, we
characterize the set BRi of best responses of firm i to s−i. To this end, we distinguish between
the two cases that z−i = 0 (Subsection 3.1) and z−i 6= 0 (Subsection 3.2). Subsection 3.3 then
contains the derived complete characterization. In Subsection 3.4, we discuss how our results
about the best responses influence the applicability of Kakutani’s fixed point theorem.
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3.1 The Case z−i = 0
In this subsection, assume that the strategies s−i = (z−i, p−i) of the other firms fulfill z−i = 0.
Under this assumption, firm i does not have a best response to s−i:
Lemma 3.1. BRi = ∅.
Proof. Whenever firm i chooses a strategy (zi, pi) with zi > 0, then xi = 1 holds for the induced
Wardrop-flow x, thus firm i’s profit is pi − γizi. On the other hand, any strategy (zi, pi) with
zi = 0 yields a profit of 0. Thus, firm i’s profit depends solely on her own strategy (zi, pi), and
can be stated as follows:
Πi(zi, pi) :=
{
pi − γizi, for zi > 0,
0, for zi = 0.
Obviously, Πi(zi, pi) < Ci holds for each (zi, pi) ∈ Si, i.e. for zi ≥ 0 and 0 ≤ pi ≤ Ci. On the
other hand, by (zi, pi) = (ε, Ci) for ε > 0, firm i gets a profit of Ci− γi · ε arbitrarily near to Ci,
that is, sup{Πi(zi, pi) : (zi, pi) ∈ Si} = Ci. This shows BRi = ∅.
3.2 The Case z−i 6= 0
In this subsection, assume that the strategies s−i = (z−i, p−i) of the other firms fulfill z−i 6= 0.
For a strategy si = (zi, pi) of firm i, write Πi(zi, pi) := Πi(si, s−i) for firm i’s profit function,
x(zi, pi) := x(si, s−i) for the Wardrop-flow induced by (si, s−i) and K(zi, pi) := K(si, s−i) for
the corresponding routing cost.
For (zi, pi) ∈ Si, firm i’s profit is Πi(zi, pi) = xi(zi, pi)pi − γizi. It is clear that each strategy
(zi, pi) with zi = 0 yields xi(zi, pi) = 0, and thus Πi(zi, pi) = 0. On the other hand, each strategy
(zi, pi) with zi >
Ci
γi
yields negative profit since
Πi(zi, pi) = xi(zi, pi)pi − γizi < 1 · Ci − γi · Ci/γi = 0.
Therefore, each best response (zi, pi) fulfills zi ≤ Ciγi since it yields nonnegative profit. Thus, BRi
can be described as the set of optimal solutions of the following optimization problem (Pi):
(Pi) max Πi(zi, pi) subject to zi ∈ [0, Ci/γi], pi ∈ [0, Ci].
(Pi) has an optimal solution, since the feasible set of (Pi) is compact and Πi is continuous in
(zi, pi) (see Theorem 2.1), and thus the theorem of Weierstrass can be applied. Since BRi can
be described as the set of optimal solutions of (Pi), we get BRi 6= ∅.
Note that (Pi) is a bilevel optimization problem (since x(zi, pi) can be described as the optimal
solution of a minimization problem ([5])), and these problems are known to be notoriously hard
to solve. The characterization of BRi that we derive here has the advantage that it only uses
ordinary optimization problems, namely the following two (1-dimensional) optimization problems
in the variable K ∈ R,
(P1i )
max f1i (K) := xi(K) · (K − bi − 2
√
aiγi)
s.t. 2
√
aiγi + bi ≤ K
K ≤ √aiγi + bi + Ci
xi(K) > 0,
(P2i )
max f2i (K) := xi(K) · (Ci −
aiγi
K − bi − Ci )
s.t.
√
aiγi + bi + Ci < K
aiγi
Ci
+ bi + Ci ≤ K
xi(K) > 0,
where
xi(K) := 1−
∑
j∈N(K)
(K − bj − pj)zj
aj
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with N+ := {j ∈ N \ {i} : zj > 0} and N(K) := {j ∈ N+ : bj + pj < K}.
Note that xi is a continuous function which is equal to 1 for 0 ≤ K ≤ min{bj + pj : j ∈ N+},
and strictly decreasing for K ≥ min{bj + pj : j ∈ N+} with limK→∞ xi(K) = −∞. Therefore,
there is a unique constant Kmaxi > 0 with the property xi(K
max
i ) = 0. Obviously, xi(K) > 0
if and only if K < Kmaxi . Furthermore, the function xi is closely related to Wardrop-flows, as
described in the following lemma:
Lemma 3.2.
1. If (zi, pi) ∈ Si with xi(zi, pi) > 0, then xi(K) = xi(zi, pi) for K := K(zi, pi).
2. If K ≥ 0 with xi(K) > 0, and (zi, pi) ∈ Si fulfills zi > 0 and aizi xi(K) + bi + pi = K, then
xi(zi, pi) = xi(K) and K(zi, pi) = K.
Proof. We start with 1., so let (zi, pi) ∈ Si such that xi(zi, pi) > 0. By definition of K :=
K(zi, pi), we get ℓj(xj(zi, pi), zj)+pj = K for all j ∈ N with xj(zi, pi) > 0, and ℓj(xj(zi, pi), zj)+
pj ≥ K for all j ∈ N with xj(zi, pi) = 0. Since
ℓj(xj(zi, pi), zj) + pj =
{
aj
zj
xj(zi, pi) + bj + pj , for j ∈ N+,
∞, for j ∈ N with zj = 0,
we get that {j ∈ N : xj(zi, pi) > 0} = {j ∈ N+ : bj+pj < K}∪{i} = N(K)∪{i}. Therefore, for
each j ∈ N(K), we get aj
zj
xj(zi, pi)+ bj + pj = K, which is equivalent to xj(zi, pi) =
(K−bj−pj)zj
aj
.
Using
∑
j∈N xj(zi, pi) = 1 yields
xi(zi, pi) = 1−
∑
j∈N\{i}
xj(zi, pi) = 1−
∑
j∈N(K)
(K − bj − pj)zj
aj
= xi(K),
as desired. Now we show 2., so let K ≥ 0 with xi(K) > 0 and let (zi, pi) ∈ Si be a strategy with
zi > 0 and
ai
zi
xi(K) + bi + pi = K. Consider the vector x ∈ [0, 1]n defined by
xj :=

xi(K), j = i,
(K−bj−pj)zj
aj
, j ∈ N+ with bj + pj < K,
0, j ∈ N+ with bj + pj ≥ K or j ∈ N \ (N+ ∪ {i}).
It is clear that xj > 0 holds for all j ∈ N+ with bj + pj < K, and xi = xi(K) > 0. Furthermore,
the definition of xi(K) yields
∑
j∈N xj = 1. We now show that x fulfills the Wardrop equilibrium
conditions. The uniqueness of the Wardrop-flow then implies x = x(zi, pi); and K(zi, pi) = K
follows from xi(zi, pi) = xi(K) > 0 and K(zi, pi) =
ai
zi
xi(zi, pi) + bi + pi =
ai
zi
xi(K) + bi + pi =
K, completing the proof. For the Wardrop equilibrium conditions, consider the effective cost
functions of the firms:
cj(x, z, p) =

ai
zi
xi(K) + bi + pi = K, j = i,
aj
zj
· (K−bj−pj)zj
aj
+ bj + pj = K, j ∈ N+ with bj + pj < K,
bj + pj ≥ K, j ∈ N+ with bj + pj ≥ K,
∞ > K, j ∈ N \ (N+ ∪ {i}).
It is now easy to see that x fulfills the Wardrop equilibrium conditions.
In the following lemmata, we analyze the connection between (P1i ) and (P
2
i ) and the optimal
solutions of (Pi).
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Lemma 3.3.
1. If K is feasible for problem (P1i ), the tuple (zi, pi) defined by
zi :=
√
ai/γi · xi(K) > 0, pi := K −√aiγi − bi
is feasible for (Pi) and fulfills Πi(zi, pi) = f
1
i (K).
2. If K is feasible for problem (P2i ), the tuple (zi, pi) defined by
zi :=
ai · xi(K)
K − bi − Ci > 0, pi := Ci
is feasible for (Pi) and fulfills Πi(zi, pi) = f
2
i (K).
Proof. We start with 1., so assume that K is feasible for problem (P1i ). Let zi :=
√
ai/γi ·xi(K)
and pi := K−√aiγi− bi as in the statement of 1.. Since xi(K) > 0, we get zi > 0. Furthermore,
ai
zi
· xi(K) + bi + pi = ai√
ai/γi · xi(K)
· xi(K) + bi +K −√aiγi − bi = K,
thus, we get xi(zi, pi) = xi(K) from 2. of Lemma 3.2. Using this, we can now show that firm i’s
profit for (zi, pi) equals the objective function value of K for (P
1
i ):
Πi(zi, pi) = pixi(zi, pi)− γizi = (K −√aiγi − bi) · xi(K)− γi ·
√
ai/γi · xi(K)
= xi(K) · (K − 2√aiγi − bi) = f1i (K)
It remains to show that (zi, pi) is feasible for (Pi). We have already seen that zi > 0, since
xi(K) > 0. The nonnegativity of Πi(zi, pi) = f1i (K) ≥ 0 yields zi ≤ Ciγi . For pi = K−
√
aiγi− bi,
the inequalities K ≥ 2√aiγi + bi and K ≤ √aiγi + bi + Ci yield pi ≥ √aiγi > 0 and pi ≤ Ci.
Therefore, (zi, pi) is feasible for (Pi).
Now turn to statement 2.. Assume that K is feasible for problem (P2i ). Let zi :=
ai·xi(K)
K−bi−Ci and
pi := Ci. The feasibility of K for (P2i ) implies zi > 0 since K >
√
aiγi + bi + Ci > bi + Ci and
xi(K) > 0. Furthermore,
ai
zi
· xi(K) + bi + pi = aiai·xi(K)
K−bi−Ci
· xi(K) + bi + Ci = K
holds, thus we get xi(zi, pi) = xi(K) from 2. of Lemma 3.2. The profit of firm i thus becomes
Πi(zi, pi) = pixi(zi, pi)− γizi = Cixi(K)− γi aixi(K)
K − bi − Ci = xi(K)(Ci −
aiγi
K − bi −Ci ) = f
2
i (K).
The feasibility of K for (P2i ) yields f
2
i (K) ≥ 0. As in 1., this implies zi ≤ Ci/γi. We already
showed zi > 0, and 0 < pi = Ci holds, thus (zi, pi) is feasible for (Pi), completing the proof.
In particular, Lemma 3.3 shows that any optimal solution of (P1i ) or (P
2
i ) yields a feasible
strategy for (Pi) with the same objective fuction value. The next lemma shows that for certain
optimal solutions of (Pi), the converse is also true.
Lemma 3.4. Let (z∗i , p
∗
i ) be an optimal solution of (Pi) and K
∗ := K(z∗i , p
∗
i ). If z
∗
i > 0, then
exactly one of the following two cases holds:
1. (z∗i , p
∗
i ) =
(√
ai/γixi(K
∗),K∗ −√aiγi − bi
)
; K∗ is optimal for (P1i ) with f1i (K
∗) = Πi(z∗i , p
∗
i ).
2. (z∗i , p
∗
i ) =
(
ai·xi(K∗)
K∗−bi−Ci , Ci
)
; K∗ is optimal for (P2i ) with f2i (K
∗) = Πi(z∗i , p
∗
i ).
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Proof. Define x∗ := x(z∗i , p
∗
i ). Since Πi(z
∗
i , p
∗
i ) ≥ 0 and z∗i > 0 holds, we get 0 ≤ Πi(z∗i , p∗i ) =
p∗ix
∗
i − γiz∗i < p∗ix∗i , thus x∗i > 0 and p∗i > 0. Therefore K∗ = aiz∗i · x
∗
i + bi + p
∗
i holds and (z
∗
i , p
∗
i )
is an optimal solution for the following optimization problem:
(P) max pix
∗
i − γizi
subject to
ai
zi
x∗i + bi + pi = K
∗
0 < zi, 0 < pi ≤ Ci.
Note that the optimal solutions of (P) correspond to all best responses for firm i such that
x∗ remains the Wardrop equilibrium. Reformulating the equality constraint in (P) yields pi =
K∗ − ai
zi
x∗i − bi. The restrictions 0 < pi ≤ Ci then become (note that K∗ > bi + pi ≥ bi holds)
0 < K∗ − ai
zi
x∗i − bi ⇔
1
zi
<
K∗ − bi
aix∗i
⇔ zi > aix
∗
i
K∗ − bi
and
K∗ − ai
zi
x∗i − bi ≤ Ci ⇔
1
zi
≥ K
∗ − bi − Ci
aix
∗
i
.
Thus (P) is equivalent to the following problem
(P′) max (K∗ − ai
zi
x∗i − bi) · x∗i − γizi
subject to
aix
∗
i
K∗ − bi < zi,
K∗ − bi − Ci
aix∗i
≤ 1
zi
.
Let f be the objective function of (P′) and consider the derivative f ′(zi) =
ai(x∗i )
2
z2i
− γi. We get
that f is strictly increasing for 0 < zi <
√
ai/γi · x∗i and strictly decreasing for zi >
√
ai/γi · x∗i .
We now distinguish between the two cases that zi =
√
ai/γi · x∗i is feasible for (P′), or not. Note
that xi(K∗) = x∗i > 0 holds (by 1. of Lemma 3.2).
If zi =
√
ai/γi · x∗i is feasible for (P′), it is the unique optimal solution of (P′). But since z∗i is
also optimal for (P′), we get
z∗i =
√
ai/γi · xi(K∗) and p∗i = K∗ −
ai
z∗i
· xi(K∗)− bi = K∗ −√aiγi − bi.
For the profit of firm i, we get
Πi(z
∗
i , p
∗
i ) = p
∗
ix
∗
i − γiz∗i = (K∗ −
√
aiγi − bi) · xi(K∗)− γi ·
√
ai
γi
· xi(K∗)
= xi(K
∗) · (K∗ − 2√aiγi − bi) = f1i (K∗).
It remains to show that K∗ is optimal for (P1i ). For feasibility, we need 2
√
aiγi + bi ≤ K∗ ≤√
aiγi + bi + Ci and xi(K∗) > 0. The last inequality follows directly from xi(K∗) = x∗i > 0.
Using this and xi(K∗) · (K∗ − 2√aiγi − bi) = Πi(z∗i , p∗i ) ≥ 0 yields K∗ ≥ 2
√
aiγi + bi. Finally,
the feasibility of z∗i =
√
ai/γi · x∗i for (P′) implies
K∗ − bi − Ci
aix∗i
≤
√
γi√
aix∗i
⇔ K∗ ≤ √aiγi + bi + Ci.
Therefore, K∗ is feasible for (P1i ). The optimality follows from Lemma 3.3 and the optimality of
(z∗i , p
∗
i ) for (Pi).
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Now turn to the case that zi =
√
ai/γi · x∗i is not feasible for (P′). Since (P′) has an optimal
solution (namely z∗i ), we get that 0 <
aix
∗
i
K∗−bi−Ci <
√
ai/γi ·x∗i holds, and therefore zi = aix
∗
i
K∗−bi−Ci
is the unique optimal solution for (P′). This shows
z∗i =
ai · xi(K∗)
K∗ − bi − Ci and p
∗
i = K
∗ − ai
z∗i
· xi(K∗)− bi = Ci.
The profit of firm i becomes
Πi(z
∗
i , p
∗
i ) = Ci · xi(K∗)− γi ·
aixi(K
∗)
K∗ − bi −Ci = xi(K
∗) · (Ci − aiγi
K∗ − bi − Ci ) = f
2
i (K
∗).
Since xi(K∗) = x∗i > 0 and the profit is nonnegative,
Ci − aiγi
K∗ − bi − Ci ≥ 0⇔ K
∗ ≥ aiγi
Ci
+ bi + Ci
holds. Finally,
z∗i =
aix
∗
i
K∗ − bi − Ci <
√
ai
γi
x∗i ⇔ K∗ >
√
aiγi + bi +Ci,
which completes the proof since we showed that K∗ is a feasible solution of problem (P2i ) (opti-
mality follows from Lemma 3.3 and the optimality of (z∗i , p
∗
i ) for (Pi)).
In the next lemma, we analyze existence of optimal solutions for the problems (P1i ) and (P
2
i )
and their properties.
Lemma 3.5.
1. If (P1i ) is feasible, it has a unique optimal solution.
2. Assume that (P2i ) is feasible.
• If Ci ≤ √aiγi, then (P2i ) has a unique optimal solution.
• If Ci > √aiγi, then (P2i ) has at most one optimal solution.
• If K∗2 is optimal for (P2i ), then f2i (K∗2 ) > 0.
3. If K∗1 is optimal for (P
1
i ) and K
∗
2 is optimal for (P
2
i ), then f
1
i (K
∗
1 ) < f
2
i (K
∗
2 ).
Proof. We start with 1., so assume that (P1i ) is feasible. Note that the feasible solution set I1
of (P1i ) either is of the form I1 = [2
√
aiγi + bi,
√
aiγi + bi + Ci] or I1 = [2
√
aiγi + bi,K
max
i ),
depending on whether
√
aiγi + bi + Ci < K
max
i , or not. We now analyze the objective function
f1i (K) = xi(K)(K − bi − 2
√
aiγi) =
1− ∑
j∈N+:bj+pj<K
(K − bj − pj)zj
aj
 (K − bi − 2√aiγi)
of (P1i ).
Let us start with the case that xi(K) = 1 for all K ∈ I1, which is equivalent to the fact that√
aiγi + bi + Ci ≤ min{bj + pj : j ∈ N+}. In particular, I1 = [2√aiγi + bi,√aiγi + bi + Ci]
holds, since xi is continuous and xi(Kmaxi ) = 0. Then, f
1
i (K) = K − bi − 2
√
aiγi is strictly
increasing over I1 and reaches its unique maximum at K =
√
aiγi + bi + Ci. Thus we showed
that K =
√
aiγi+bi+Ci is the unique optimal solution of (P
1
i ) for the case that
√
aiγi+bi+Ci ≤
min{bj + pj : j ∈ N+}.
Next, consider the case that min{bj + pj : j ∈ N+} < 2√aiγi + bi. This implies that N(K) =
{j ∈ N+ : bj + pj < K} 6= ∅ for all K ∈ I1, in particular for K = 2√aiγi + bi. If we increase K,
the set N(K) remains constant until we reach K ′ := min{bj + pj : j /∈ N(K)}. For any ε > 0,
11
we then get N(K ′ + ε) ) N(K). This means that we can subdivide I1 as follows: Consider
all different values bj + pj for j ∈ N+ which are contained in I1, and let α1 < α2 < · · · < αk
denote these values in ascending order. If we increase K from 2
√
aiγi+ bi, the set N(K) remains
constant until we reach α1. Immediately after α1 it increases, and then it is again constant
until α2, and so on. This yields that f1i is differentiable on the (open) intervals where N(K) is
constant. The first and second derivative of f1i then are
(f1i )
′(K) =
− ∑
j∈N(K)
zj
aj
 (K − bi − 2√aiγi) + 1− ∑
j∈N(K)
(K − bj − pj)zj
aj
= 1−
∑
j∈N(K)
(2K − bj − pj − bi − 2√aiγi)zj
aj
and
(f1i )
′′(K) = −2 ·
∑
j∈N(K)
zj
aj
.
Since we assumed N(K) 6= ∅ for all K ∈ I1, we get (f1i )′′(K) < 0, i.e. f1i is strictly concave on
the open intervals where N(K) is constant. It remains to consider the values αℓ where N(K)
increases, that is, N(αℓ + ε) = N(αℓ) ∪ {j ∈ N+ : bj + pj = αℓ} for all 0 < ε ≤ αℓ+1 − αℓ. Note
that f1i is continuous at αℓ. We now show that the slope of f
1
i does not increase at αℓ, where we
mean that
lim
εց0
(f1i )
′(αℓ + ε) ≤ lim
εց0
(f1i )
′(αℓ − ε)
holds, which shows that f1i is strictly concave over I1 and (P
1
i ) has at most one optimal solution.
Consider
lim
εց0
(f1i )
′(αℓ − ε) = lim
εց0
1− ∑
j∈N(αℓ−ε)
(2(αℓ − ε)− bj − pj − bi − 2√aiγi)zj
aj

= lim
εց0
1− ∑
j∈N(αℓ)
(2(αℓ − ε)− bj − pj − bi − 2√aiγi)zj
aj

= 1−
∑
j∈N(αℓ)
(2αℓ − bj − pj − bi − 2√aiγi)zj
aj
and
lim
εց0
(f1i )
′(αℓ + ε) = lim
εց0
1− ∑
j∈N(αℓ+ε)
(2(αℓ + ε)− bj − pj − bi − 2√aiγi)zj
aj

= lim
εց0
1− ∑
j∈N(αℓ)
(2(αℓ + ε)− bj − pj − bi − 2√aiγi)zj
aj
−
∑
j∈N+:bj+pj=αℓ
(2(αℓ + ε)− bj − pj − bi − 2√aiγi)zj
aj

= 1−
∑
j∈N(αℓ)
(2αℓ − bj − pj − bi − 2√aiγi)zj
aj
−
∑
j∈N+:bj+pj=αℓ
(2αℓ − αℓ − bi − 2√aiγi)zj
aj
= lim
εց0
(f1i )
′(αℓ − ε)− (αℓ − bi − 2√aiγi) ·
∑
j∈N+:bj+tj=αℓ
zj
aj
.
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Since K = αℓ is feasible for (P
1
i ), we get αℓ ≥ 2
√
aiγi + bi and thus the desired inequality
lim
εց0
(f1i )
′(αℓ + ε) ≤ lim
εց0
(f1i )
′(αℓ − ε).
Finally, we show that (P1i ) actually has an optimal solution. If I1 = [2
√
aiγi+ bi,
√
aiγi+ bi+Ci]
holds, this follows since f1i is continuous. For I1 = [2
√
aiγi + bi,K
max
i ), note that f
1
i (2
√
aiγi +
bi) = 0 = f
1
i (K
max
i ). Since f
1
i is strictly concave and nonnegative over I1, the existence of an
optimal solution follows. Altogether we have shown that (P1i ) has a unique optimal solution if
min{bj + pj : j ∈ N+} < 2√aiγi + bi.
The remaining case in the proof of 1. is 2
√
aiγi+bi ≤ min{bj+pj : j ∈ N+} < √aiγi+bi+Ci. By
a combination of the argumentation in the other two cases, we get that f1i is strictly increasing
until K = min{bj + pj : j ∈ N+}, and strictly concave afterwards, so that (P1i ) has at most one
optimal solution. By a similar argumentation as in the second case, (P1i ) also has an optimal
solution, completing the proof of 1..
Now consider 2. and assume that (P2i ) is feasible. Let I2 be the feasible solution set of
(P2i ). Note that I2 is always an interval with positive length, so there exists K ∈ I2 with
K > aiγi
Ci
+ bi +Ci, which implies f2i (K) > 0. Therefore, if (P
2
i ) has an optimal solution K
∗
2 , we
get f2i (K
∗
2 ) > 0. In the following, we will show that
f2i (K) = xi(K)
(
Ci − aiγi
K − bi − Ci
)
=
1− ∑
j∈N(K)
(K − bj − pj)zj
aj
(Ci − aiγi
K − bi − Ci
)
is strictly concave over I2. This immediately implies that (P2i ) has at most one optimal solution.
For Ci ≤ √aiγi, we also get the existence of an optimal solution by using the strict quasiconcavity
and nonnegativity of f2i together with f
2
i (
aiγi
Ci
+ bi + Ci) = f
2
i (K
max
i ) = 0.
It remains to show that f2i is strictly quasiconcave. As for (P
1
i ), subdivide I2 by using the values
β1 < β2 < · · · < βk′ corresponding to the different values of bj + pj for j ∈ N+ contained in I2.
Then, f2i is differentiable on the open intervalls where N(K) is constant and we get:
(f2i )
′(K) = −
∑
j∈N(K)
zj
aj
·
(
Ci − aiγi
K − bi − Ci
)
+ xi(K) · aiγi
(K − bi − Ci)2
(f2i )
′′(K) = −
∑
j∈N(K)
zj
aj
· aiγi
(K − bi − Ci)2 −
∑
j∈N(K)
zj
aj
· aiγi
(K − bi − Ci)2 + xi(K) ·
−2aiγi
(K − bi − Ci)3
= − 2aiγi
(K − bi − Ci)2 ·
 ∑
j∈N(K)
zj
aj
+
xi(K)
K − bi − Ci

Since xi(K) > 0 for K ∈ I2, the second derivative is negative, and thus f2i is strictly concave on
the open intervals where N(K) is constant. Now consider K = βℓ where N(K) increases. Note
that f2i is continuous at βℓ. We now show that the slope of f
2
i does not increase at βℓ, i.e.
lim
εց0
(f2i )
′(βℓ + ε) ≤ lim
εց0
(f2i )
′(βℓ − ε)
holds, which implies that f2i is strictly concave over I2. Consider
lim
εց0
(f2i )
′(βℓ − ε) = lim
εց0
− ∑
j∈N(βℓ−ε)
zj
aj
(
Ci − aiγi
βℓ − ε− bi − Ci
)
+ xi(βℓ − ε) aiγi
(βℓ − ε− bi − Ci)2

= lim
εց0
− ∑
j∈N(βℓ)
zj
aj
(
Ci − aiγi
βℓ − ε− bi − Ci
)
+ xi(βℓ − ε) aiγi
(βℓ − ε− bi − Ci)2

= −
∑
j∈N(βℓ)
zj
aj
(
Ci − aiγi
βℓ − bi − Ci
)
+ xi(βℓ)
aiγi
(βℓ − bi − Ci)2
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and
lim
εց0
(f2i )
′(βℓ + ε) = lim
εց0
− ∑
j∈N(βℓ+ε)
zj
aj
(
Ci − aiγi
βℓ + ε− bi − Ci
)
+ xi(βℓ + ε)
aiγi
(βℓ + ε− bi − Ci)2

= lim
εց0
− ∑
j∈N(βℓ)
zj
aj
(
Ci − aiγi
βℓ + ε− bi − Ci
)
+ xi(βℓ + ε)
aiγi
(βℓ + ε− bi − Ci)2
−
∑
j∈N+:bj+pj=βℓ
zj
aj
(
Ci − aiγi
βℓ + ε− bi − Ci
)
= lim
εց0
(f2i )
′(βℓ − ε)−
∑
j∈N+:bj+pj=βℓ
zj
aj
(
Ci − aiγi
βℓ − bi − Ci
)
.
Since K = βℓ is feasible for (P
2
i ), we get Ci − aiγiβℓ−bi−Ci ≥ 0, and thus the desired inequality
lim
εց0
(f2i )
′(βℓ + ε) ≤ lim
εց0
(f2i )
′(βℓ − ε),
completing the proof of 2..
Finally we show 3., so assume that K∗1 and K
∗
2 are the optimal solutions of (P
1
i ) and (P
2
i ).
Since (P1i ) and (P
2
i ) have to be feasible,
√
aiγi ≤ Ci and √aiγi + bi + Ci < Kmaxi holds. This
implies that the feasible solution set of (P1i ) is I1 = [2
√
aiγi+ bi,
√
aiγi+ bi+Ci] and the feasible
solution set of (P2i ) is I2 = (
√
aiγi + bi + Ci,K
max
i ). Let K¯ =
√
aiγi + bi + Ci. Then,
f1i (K¯) = xi(
√
aiγi + bi + Ci) · (√aiγi + bi + Ci − bi − 2√aiγi)
= xi(
√
aiγi + bi + Ci) · (Ci −√aiγi)
= xi(
√
aiγi + bi + Ci) ·
(
Ci − aiγi√
aiγi + bi + Ci − bi − Ci
)
= f2i (K¯)
holds. If additionally the slope of f1i in K¯ is greater or equal than the slope of f
2
i in K¯, i.e.
lim
εց0
(f1i )
′(K¯ − ε) ≥ lim
εց0
(f2i )
′(K¯ + ε)
holds, we get f1i (K
∗
1 ) = f
1
i (K¯) < f
2
i (K
∗
2 ) by using our analysis of f
1
i and f
2
i from 1. and 2..
The remaining inequality about the slopes follows from
lim
εց0
(f1i )
′(K¯ − ε) = lim
εց0
1− ∑
j∈N(K¯−ε)
(2(K¯ − ε)− bj − pj − bi − 2√aiγi)zj
aj

= lim
εց0
1− ∑
j∈N(K¯)
(2Ci + bi − 2ε− bj − pj)zj
aj

= 1−
∑
j∈N(K¯)
(2Ci + bi − bj − pj)zj
aj
and
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lim
εց0
(f2i )
′(K¯ + ε) = lim
εց0
− ∑
j∈N(K¯+ε)
zj
aj
(
Ci − aiγi
K¯ + ε− bi −Ci
)
+ xi(K¯ + ε)
aiγi
(K¯ + ε− bi − Ci)2

= lim
εց0
− ∑
j∈N(K¯+ε)
zj
aj
(
Ci − aiγi√
aiγi + ε
)
+ xi(K¯ + ε)
aiγi
(
√
aiγi + ε)2

= lim
εց0
− ∑
j∈N(K¯)
zj
aj
(
Ci − aiγi√
aiγi + ε
)
+ xi(K¯ + ε)
aiγi
(
√
aiγi + ε)2
−
∑
j∈N+:bj+pj=K¯
zj
aj
(
Ci − aiγi√
aiγi + ε
)
= −
∑
j∈N(K¯)
zj
aj
(Ci −√aiγi) + xi(K¯)−
∑
j∈N+:bj+pj=K¯
zj
aj
(Ci −√aiγi)
≤ −
∑
j∈N(K¯)
zj
aj
(Ci −√aiγi) + 1−
∑
j∈N(K¯)
(K¯ − bj − pj)zj
aj
= 1−
∑
j∈N(K¯)
(2Ci + bi − bj − pj)zj
aj
,
where the inequality follows from the definition of xi and
√
aiγi ≤ Ci.
3.3 The Characterization
The following theorem provides a complete characterization of the best response correspondence.
We will make use of this characterization several times during the rest of the paper.
Theorem 3.6. For a firm i ∈ N and fixed strategies s−i = (z−i, p−i) ∈ S−i of the other firms,
the set BRi = BRi(s−i) of best responses of firm i to s−i is given as indicated in the following
Table 1, where the first column contains BRi and the second column contains the conditions on
s−i under which BRi has the stated form. For j = 1, 2, K∗j denotes the unique optimal solution
of problem (Pji ), if this problem has an optimal solution.
{(zi, pi)} = BRi conditions
∅ z−i = 0
{(0, pi) : 0 ≤ pi ≤ Ci} z−i 6= 0, (P1i ) and (P2i ) infeasible{(
ai·xi(K∗2 )
K∗
2
−bi−Ci , Ci
)}
z−i 6= 0, (P2i ) has an optimal solution{(√
ai
γi
· xi(K∗1 ),K∗1 −
√
aiγi − bi
)}
z−i 6= 0, (P1i ) feasible, (P2i ) has no optimal solution
Table 1: Characterization of BRi.
Furthermore, for the cases where si = (zi, pi) is the unique best response of firm i to s−i, we get
zi > 0 and Πi(si, s−i) > 0 (since the uniqueness obviously implies these properties).
Proof. We show that the case distinction covers all possible cases, and the given representation
for BRi is correct for each case. If z−i = 0, Lemma 3.1 shows BRi = ∅. For the rest of the
proof, assume z−i 6= 0. Therefore, firm i has at least one best response to s−i. If (P1i ) and (P2i )
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are both infeasible, Lemma 3.4 implies that each best response (zi, pi) fulfills zi = 0. Therefore,
BRi = {0}×[0, Ci]. For the remaining proof, assume that at least one of (P1i ) and (P2i ) is feasible.
First consider the case that (P2i ) has an optimal solution. By 2. of Lemma 3.5, (P
2
i ) has a
unique optimal solution K∗2 with f
2
i (K
∗
2 ) > 0. Lemma 3.3 shows that each best response yields
a profit of at least f2i (K
∗
2 ) > 0. In particular, there is no best response (zi, pi) with zi = 0. To
achieve BRi = {( aixi(K
∗
2
)
K∗
2
−bi−Ci , Ci)}, it remains to show that each best response (zi, pi) with zi > 0
fulfills (zi, pi) = (
aixi(K
∗
2 )
K∗
2
−bi−Ci , Ci). Note that either (P
1
i ) is infeasible, or it has a unique optimal
solution K∗1 with f
1
i (K
∗
1 ) < f
2
i (K
∗
2 ) (see 1. and 3. from Lemma 3.5). In both cases, Lemma 3.4
yields that each best response (zi, pi) with zi > 0 fulfills (zi, pi) = (
aixi(K
∗
2 )
K∗
2
−bi−Ci , Ci), showing the
claim for the case that (P2i ) has an optimal solution.
Now assume that (P2i ) does not have an optimal solution (either (P
2
i ) is infeasible, or it is
feasible, but the maximum is not attained). We first show that (P1i ) is feasible. If (P
2
i ) is
infeasible, (P1i ) is feasible since we assumed that at least one of the two problems is feasible.
Otherwise (P2i ) is feasible, but does not have an optimal solution. Then, Ci >
√
aiγi follows
from 2. of Lemma 3.5, and
√
aiγi + bi + Ci < K
max
i follows since (P
2
i ) is feasible. Together,
2
√
aiγi + bi <
√
aiγi + bi +Ci < K
max
i holds, showing that (P
1
i ) is feasible. By 1. of Lemma 3.5
we then get that (P1i ) has a unique optimal solution K
∗
1 . Furthermore, each best response (zi, pi)
with zi > 0 fulfills (zi, pi) = (
√
ai/γi · xi(K∗1 ),K∗1 −
√
aiγi − bi) (see Lemma 3.4). To complete
the proof, we need to show that there is no best response (zi, pi) with zi = 0. This follows from
Lemma 3.3 and f1i (K
∗
1 ) > 0: Note that f
1
i (K
∗
1 ) = 0 is only possible if K
∗ = 2√aiγi + bi is
the only feasible solution for (P1i ), which means that
√
aiγi = Ci and
√
aiγi + bi + Ci < K
max
i .
But this now implies that (P2i ) is feasible and has an optimal solution (by 2. of Lemma 3.5);
contradiction.
3.4 Discussion
We now briefly discuss consequences of the characterization of the best-reponse correspondences
with respect to applying Kakutani’s fixed point theorem [22] (or related results such as those in
Fan and Glicksberg [17, 19]). Kakutani’s theorem requires that for each firm i and each vector
s−i = (z−i, p−i) of strategies of the other firms, the set BRi(s−i) of best responses is nonempty
(and convex). But, as we have seen in Lemma 3.1, the set BRi(s−i) can be empty, namely if
z−i = 0. On the other hand, a strategy profile with z−i = 0 for some firm i will never be a PNE
(obviously).
A first natural approach to overcome the problem of empty best responses is the following.
Given a strategy profile s = (z, p) such that z−i = 0 for some firm i, redefine, for each such
firm i, the set BRi(s−i) by some suitable nonempty closed convex set. “Suitable” here means
that the correspondence BRi should have a closed graph and at the same time s must not be a
fixed point of the correspondence BR = (BRi)i∈N . But unfortunately, these two goals are not
compatible: For the strategy profile s = (z, p) with (zi, pi) = (0, Ci) for all firms i, the closed
graph property requires (0, Ci) ∈ BRi(s−i) for all i, which implies that s is a fixed point of BR.
Another intuitive idea is to consider a game in which each firm has an initial capacity of some
ε > 0. If this game has a PNE for each ε, the limit for ε going to zero should be a PNE for our
original capacity and price competition game. For the game with at least ε capacity, one can also
characterize the best-response correspondence (now by optimal solutions of three optimization
problems), but the main problem is that concavity of the objective functions may be lost, thus
it is not clear if the best-response correspondence is convex. Therefore, it is not clear how to
apply Kakutani’s fixed point theorem. Instead, we will use an existence result due to McLennan
et al. [25], see Section 4.2
2Perhaps interesting, McLennan et al. [25] identify a non-trivial restriction of the player’s non-equilibrium
strategies so that they can eventually apply Kakutani’s theorem.
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4 Existence of Equilibria
In this section, we show that each capacity and price competition game has a PNE. A frequently
used tool to show existence of PNE is Kakutani’s fixed point theorem. But, as discussed in
Subsection 3.4, we cannot directly apply this result to show existence of PNE. Furthermore, the
existence theorem of Reny [27] can also not be used, since a capacity and price competition game
is not quasiconcave in general. Instead, we turn to another existence result due to McLennan,
Monteiro and Tourky [25]. They introduced a concept called C-security and they showed that if
the game is C-secure at each strategy profile which is not a PNE, then a PNE exists. Informally,
the game is C-secure at a strategy profile s if there is a vector α ∈ Rn satisfying the following
two properties: First, each firm i has some securing strategy for αi which is robust to small
deviations of the other firms, i.e. firm i always achieves a profit of at least αi by playing this
strategy even if the other firms slightly deviate from their strategies in s−i. The second property
requires for each slightly perturbed strategy profile s′ resulting from s, that there is at least
one firm i such that her perturbed strategy s′i can (in some sense) be strictly separated from
all strategies achieving a profit of αi, so in particular from all her securing strategies. One can
think of firm i being “not happy” with her perturbed strategy s′i since she could achieve a higher
profit. This already indicates the connection between a strategy profile, which is not a PNE,
and C-security. We will see that for certain strategy profiles, αi can be chosen as the profit that
firm i gets by playing a best response to s−i.3 Then, firm i’s securing strategies for αi are related
to her set of best responses, and we need to “strictly separate” these best responses from si. At
this point, our characterization of best responses in Theorem 3.6 becomes useful.
We now formally describe McLennan et al.’s result in our context. First of all, note that they
consider games with compact convex strategy sets and bounded profit functions. In a capacity
and price competition game, the strategy set Si = {(zi, pi) : 0 ≤ zi, 0 ≤ pi ≤ Ci} of firm i is not
compact a priory. But, since zi will never be larger than Ci/γi in any best response, and thus
in any PNE (see the discussion on page 7), we can redefine Si := {(zi, pi) : 0 ≤ zi ≤ Ci/γi, 0 ≤
pi ≤ Ci} without changing the set of PNE of the game, for any firm i. Furthermore, this also
does not change the best responses, so Theorem 3.6 continues to hold. Using the redefined
strategies, for any firm i and any strategy profile s, the profit function of firm i is bounded by
−Ci ≤ Πi(s) ≤ Ci.
For a strategy profile s ∈ S, firm i ∈ N and αi ∈ R let
Bi(s, αi) := {s′i ∈ Si : Πi(s′i, s−i) ≥ αi} and Ci(s, αi) := convBi(s, αi),
where convBi(s, αi) denotes the convex hull of Bi(s, αi).
Definition 4.1. A firm i can secure a payoff αi ∈ R on S′ ⊆ S, if there is some si ∈ Si such
that si ∈ Bi(s′, αi) for all s′ ∈ S′. We say that firm i can secure αi at s ∈ S, if she can secure αi
on U ∩ S for some open set U with s ∈ U .
Definition 4.2. The game is C-secure on S′ ⊆ S, if there is an α ∈ Rn such that the following
conditions hold:
(i) Every firm i can secure αi on S′.
(ii) For any s′ ∈ S′, there exists some firm i with s′i /∈ Ci(s′, αi).
The game is C-secure at s ∈ S, if it is C-secure on U ∩ S for some open set U with s ∈ U .
We can now state the existence result of McLennan et al.:
Theorem 4.3 (Proposition 2.7 in [25]). If the game is C-secure at each s ∈ S that is not a PNE,
then the game has a PNE.
3More precisely, we need to choose αi slightly smaller than the profit of a best response.
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We now turn to capacity and price competition games and show the existence of a PNE by
using Theorem 4.3, i.e., we show that if a given strategy profile s = (z, p) is not a PNE, then
the game is C-secure at s. To this end, we distinguish between the two cases that there are at
least two firms i with zi > 0 (Lemma 4.4), or not (Lemma 4.5). Both lemmata together then
imply the desired existence result. Note that the mentioned case distinction is equivalent to the
case distinction that each firm i has a best response for s−i, or there is at least one firm i with
BRi(s−i) = ∅ (see Theorem 3.6).
We start with the case that all best responses exist. The proof of the following lemma follows
an argument in [25, p. 1647f] where McLennan et al. show that Proposition 4.3 implies the
existence result of Nishimura and Friedman [26].
Lemma 4.4. Let s = (z, p) ∈ S be a strategy profile which is not a PNE. Assume that there are
at least two firms i ∈ N such that zi > 0 holds. Then the game is C-secure at s.
In the proof of Lemma 4.4, we will use the following notation. Let S′ ⊆ S be a subset of
the strategy profiles and i ∈ N . By S′i ⊆ Si, we denote the projection of S′ into Si, the set of
firm i’s strategies, and S′−i ⊆ S−i denotes the projection of S′ into S−i =
∏
j∈N\{i} Sj, the set of
strategies of the other firms.
Proof of Lemma 4.4. Since z has at least two positive entries zi, all strategy profiles s′ = (z′, p′)
in a sufficiently small open neighbourhood of s also have at least two entries z′i > 0. In the
following, whenever we speak of an open set U containing s, we implicitly require U small
enough to fulfill this property. Furthermore, since it is clear that we are only interested in the
elements of U which are strategy profiles, we simply write U instead of U ∩ S. Consequently,
s′ ∈ U denotes a strategy profile contained in U .
Since we assumed that at least two firms have positive capacity at s = (z, p), we get that
z−i 6= 0 holds for each firm i. Thus, by Theorem 3.6, each firm i has a best response to s−i, and
the set of best responses either is a singleton, or consists of all strategies (0, pi) for 0 ≤ pi ≤ Ci.
Since s is not a PNE, there is at least one firm j such that sj = (zj , pj) is not a best response,
i.e. either sj 6= s∗j for the unique best response s∗j , or zj > 0, and all best responses s∗j = (z∗j , p∗j )
fulfill z∗j = 0. In both cases it is clear that there is a hyperplane H which strictly separates sj
from the set of best responses to s−j.
We now turn to the properties in Definition 4.2. For each firm i, let s∗i be a best response of
firm i to s−i and βi := Πi(s∗i , s−i). We know from Theorem 2.1 that Πi is continuous in (s
∗
i , s−i)
for each firm i. Therefore, for each ε > 0, there is an open set U = U(ε) containing s such that
Πi(s
∗
i , s
′
−i) ≥ βi−ε for each s′ ∈ U and each firm i. That is, each firm i can secure βi−ε on U(ε).
Now turn to the second property and consider firm j. We now show that there is an ε > 0 and
an open set U ⊆ U(ε) containing s, such that for each s′ ∈ U , the hyperplane H (which strictly
separates sj and Bj(s, βj)) also strictly separates s′j and Bj(s
′, βj − ε), thus s′j /∈ Cj(s′, βj − ε)
(see Figure 1 for an illustration). Since each firm i can secure βi−ε on U ⊆ U(ε), both properties
of Definition 4.2 are fulfilled, completing the proof.
To this end, choose an open set V containing Bj(s, βj) such that H strictly separates sj and V .
Since Sj\V is a compact set and Πj is continuous in (s˜j, s−j) for all s˜j ∈ Sj \V (by Theorem 2.1),
we get that f(s−j) := max{Πj(s˜j, s−j) : s˜j ∈ Sj \ V } exists. Furthermore, since Bj(s, βj) ⊂ V ,
we get f(s−j) < βj. Let 0 < ε < βj − f(s−j), thus f(s−j) < βj − ε.
Note that if we consider, for an open neighbourhood U¯ of s and for fixed s′−j ∈ U¯−j, the problem
of maximizing Πj(s˜j , s′−j) subject to s˜j ∈ Sj \ V , Berge’s theorem of the maximum [6] yields
that f(s′−j) := max{Πj(s˜j , s′−j) : s˜j ∈ Sj \ V } is a continuous function.
Using the continuity of f , there is an open set U ⊆ U(ε) containing s such that f(s′−j) < βj−ε for
all s′−j ∈ U−j . Additionally, let U be small enough that H strictly separates Uj and V . Now we
have the desired properties: For each s′ ∈ U and for each s˜j ∈ Sj \V , we get Πj(s˜j, s′−j) < βj−ε,
thus Bj(s′, βj − ε) ⊂ V . Since s′j ∈ Uj and H strictly separates Uj and V , we get that H strictly
separates s′j and Bj(s
′, βj − ε), as desired.
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Hs∗j
sjs′j
V
Uj
Bj(s
′, βj − ǫ)
Figure 1: Illustration of the proof construction for the case Bj(s, βj) = {s∗j}. Note that it is not
necessary that s∗j ∈ Bj(s′, βj − ǫ).
It remains to analyze the strategy profiles s = (z, p) with at most one positive zi.
Lemma 4.5. Let s = (z, p) ∈ S be a strategy profile such that zi > 0 holds for at most one firm i
(note that these profiles cannot be PNE). Then the game is C-secure at s.
Proof. We distinguish between the two cases that there is a firm with positive capacity, or not.
First consider the case that zi > 0 for firm i, and zj = 0 for all j 6= i. Choose αi ∈ (Ci−γizi, Ci)
and 0 < ε < min{zi, αi+γizi−Ciγi }. Then, there is an open ball U with center s such that firm i can
secure αi on U ∩S =: S′ (note that firm i can secure each profit < Ci by choosing U sufficiently
small), and |z′i − zi| < ε holds for each s′ = (z′, p′) ∈ S′. For j 6= i, set αj := 0. It is clear that
each firm j 6= i can secure αj = 0 on S′ (by any strategy with zj = 0). In this way, property (i)
of C-security is fulfilled. For property (ii), let s′ = (z′, p′) ∈ S′. We show that s′i /∈ Ci(s′, αi)
holds. To this end, note that any strategy s∗i = (z
∗
i , p
∗
i ) ∈ Bi(s′, αi), i.e. with Πi(s∗i , s′−i) ≥ αi,
fulfills z∗i ≤ zi − ε, since, for z∗i > zi − ε, we get
Πi(s
∗
i , s
′
−i) = xi(s
∗
i , s
′
−i)p
∗
i − γiz∗i ≤ Ci − γiz∗i < Ci − γi(zi − ε) < αi.
Clearly, any strategy in Ci(s′, αi), i.e. any convex combination of strategies in Bi(s′, αi), then
also has this property. Since z′i > zi − ε, we get (z′i, p′i) /∈ Ci(s′, αi), as desired. Thus we showed
that the game is C-secure at s if one firm has positive capacity.
Now turn to the case that zi = 0 for all i ∈ N . We further distinguish between two subcases,
namely that there is a firm i with pi < Ci, or all prices are at their upper bounds.
First consider the subcase that pi < Ci holds for firm i. Choose αi with pi < αi < Ci. There
is an open ball U with center s such that firm i can secure αi on U ∩ S =: S′, and p′i < αi holds
for each s′ = (z′, p′) ∈ S′. By setting αj := 0 for all j 6= i, property (i) of C-security is fulfilled.
For property (ii), let s′ = (z′, p′) ∈ S′. Our assumption about U yields p′i < αi. On the other
hand, any strategy s∗i = (z
∗
i , p
∗
i ) with Πi(s
∗
i , s
′
−i) ≥ αi fulfills p∗i > αi. In particular, this holds
for any strategy in Ci(s′, αi), thus showing that s′i /∈ Ci(s′, αi). Therefore, the game is C-secure
at s for the case that all zi are zero, and there is a firm i with pi < Ci.
It remains to consider the case that (zi, pi) = (0, Ci) holds for all firms i. For each firm i,
choose αi with (1− ai2(ai+Ci))Ci < αi < Ci. Note that this implies
1
2
<
1
2
+
Ci − αi
ai
<
αi
Ci
. (1)
There is an open ball U with center s such that each firm i can secure αi on U ∩ S =: S′, and
z′i < 1 holds for each profile s
′ = (z′, p′) ∈ S′. Thus, property (i) of C-security is fulfilled. For
property (ii), let s′ = (z′, p′) ∈ S′. In the following, s∗i = (z∗i , p∗i ) denotes a strategy of firm i
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with Πi(s∗i , s
′
−i) ≥ αi. We say that s∗i achieves a profit of αi. Obviously, z∗i > 0 and p∗i > αi
holds. Furthermore, xi(s∗i , s
′
−i) >
1
2 , since Πi(s
∗
i , s
′
−i) = xi(s
∗
i , s
′
−i)p
∗
i − γiz∗i ≥ αi implies
xi(s
∗
i , s
′
−i) ≥
αi + γiz
∗
i
p∗i
>
αi
Ci
>
1
2
.
Since n ≥ 2, there is at least one firm i with xi(s′) ≤ 12 . We now show that s′i /∈ Ci(s′, αi).
If z′i = 0 or p
′
i ≤ αi holds, s′i /∈ Ci(s′, αi) follows since z∗i > 0 and p∗i > αi holds for any
strategy (z∗i , p
∗
i ) achieving a profit of at least αi. Thus we can assume w.l.o.g. that z
′
i > 0 and
p′i > αi holds. We can furthermore assume w.l.o.g. that xi(s
′) > 0 holds: If xi(s′) = 0, the
Wardrop conditions yield K(s′) ≤ bi + p′i. Any strategy s¯i = (z¯i, p¯i) with p¯i ≥ p′i then yields
x(s¯i, s
′
−i) = x(s
′), thus x′i(s¯i, s
′
−i) = 0 and Πi(s¯i, s
′
−i) < αi. Therefore p
∗
i < p
′
i holds for any
strategy (z∗i , p
∗
i ) achieving a profit of at least αi, and thus s
′
i /∈ Ci(s′, αi) follows. Altogether, we
can assume w.l.o.g. that s′i = (z
′
i, p
′
i) has the following properties:
0 < xi(s
′
i, s−i) ≤
1
2
, αi < p
′
i ≤ Ci and 0 < z′i < 1. (2)
We now show that each strategy s∗i = (z
∗
i , p
∗
i ) with Πi(s
∗
i , s
′
−i) ≥ αi fulfills z∗i > z′i, showing that
s′i /∈ Ci(s′, αi) and completing the proof.
Assume, by contradiction, that there is a strategy s∗i = (z
∗
i , p
∗
i ) which achieves a profit of αi
and fulfills z∗i ≤ z′i. For any strategy s˜i ∈ Si, write x(s˜i) := x(s˜i, s′−i) and K(s˜i) := K(s˜i, s′−i).
Now consider the strategy s˜i := (z′i, αi). If
K(s˜i) ≤ K(s∗i ) < K(s′i) (3)
holds, we can derive the following properties: K(s˜i) < K(s′i) implies
ai
z′i
xi(s˜i) + bi + αi <
ai
z′i
xi(s
′
i) + bi + p
′
i. Reformulating this inequality and using (2) and (1) then yields
xi(s˜i) <
z′i(p
′
i − αi)
ai
+ xi(s
′
i) <
Ci − αi
ai
+
1
2
<
αi
Ci
. (4)
The inequality K(s˜i) ≤ K(s∗i ) from (3) implies xj(s˜i) ≤ xj(s∗i ) for all firms j 6= i. Therefore,
xi(s˜i) ≥ xi(s∗i ) holds. Using that xi(s∗i ) > αiCi now leads to xi(s˜i) >
αi
Ci
, which contradicts (4).
It remains to show (3). The property K(s∗i ) < K(s
′
i) holds since K(s
∗
i ) ≥ K(s′i) would imply
xj(s
∗
i ) ≥ xj(s′i) for all firms j 6= i, and thus xi(s∗i ) ≤ xi(s′i), but we know that xi(s∗i ) > 1/2 ≥
xi(s
′
i). It remains to show K(s˜i) ≤ K(s∗i ). Assume, by contradiction, that K(s˜i) > K(s∗i ). This
implies xj(s˜i) ≥ xj(s∗i ) for all firms j 6= i, and thus xi(s˜i) ≤ xi(s∗i ). Together with z∗i ≤ z′i and
p∗i > αi, this leads to the following contradiction, completing the proof:
K(s˜i) ≤ ai
z′i
xi(s˜i) + bi + αi <
ai
z∗i
xi(s
∗
i ) + bi + p
∗
i = K(s
∗
i ) < K(s˜i).
Using Theorem 4.3 together with the Lemmata 4.4 and 4.5 now yields the existence of a PNE:
Theorem 4.6. Every capacity and price competition game has a pure Nash equilibrium.
We remark here that in any PNE (z, p), there are at least two firms i with zi > 0.
5 Uniqueness of Equilibria
As we have seen in the last section, a capacity and price competition game always has a PNE. In
this section we show that this equilbrium is essentially unique. With essentially we mean that
if (z, p) and (z′, p′) are two different PNE, and i ∈ N is a firm such that (zi, pi) 6= (z′i, p′i), then
zi = z
′
i = 0 holds (and thus pi 6= p′i).
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For a PNE s = (z, p), denote by N+(z, p) := {i ∈ N : zi > 0} the set of firms with positive
capacity (note that |N+(z, p)| ≥ 2 and N+(z, p) = {i ∈ N : xi(s) > 0}). For i ∈ N+(z, p),
let (P1i )(s−i) and (P
2
i )(s−i) be the two auxiliary problems from Section 3.4 By Lemma 3.4,
the routing cost K(z, p) is an optimal solution of either (P1i )(s−i) or (P
2
i )(s−i). We denote by
N+1 (z, p) the set of firms i ∈ N+(z, p) such that K(z, p) is an optimal solution of (P1i )(s−i), and
N+2 (z, p) contains the firms i ∈ N+(z, p) such that K(z, p) is an optimal solution of (P2i )(s−i).
Thus N+(z, p) = N+1 (z, p)
.∪N+2 (z, p).
The proofs in this section are similar to the proofs that Johari et al. [21] use to derive their
uniqueness results. However, since our model includes price caps, some new ideas are required,
in particular the decomposition of N+(z, p) in N+1 (z, p)
.∪N+2 (z, p).
We first derive further necessary equilibrium conditions (by using the KKT conditions) which
will become useful in the remaining analysis.
Lemma 5.1. Let s = (z, p) be a PNE with x := x(z, p) and K := K(z, p). Let i ∈ N+ :=
N+(z, p). If pi < Ci holds, then zi =
√
ai
γi
xi, pi =
xi∑
j∈N+\i
zj
aj
+
√
aiγi, and if pi = Ci, then
zi =
aixi
K−bi−Ci and
Ci
1+
ai
zi
·∑
j∈N+\i
zj
aj
=
γiz
2
i
aixi
∑
j∈N+\i
zj
aj
.
Proof. Since (z, p) is a PNE, pj > 0 and xj > 0 holds for all j ∈ N+, and xk = 0 holds for
k /∈ N+. Furthermore, (zi, pi) is a best response for firm i to s−i and K = ajxjzj + bj + pj holds
for all j ∈ N+. Altogether we get that (zi, pi, (xj)j∈N+) is an optimal solution for the following
optimization problem:
max x′ip
′
i − γiz′i
subject to 0 ≤ p′i ≤ Ci
0 ≤ z′i∑
j∈N+
x′j = 1
x′j ≥ 0 ∀j ∈ N+
aixi
zi
+ bi + pi =
ajxj
zj
+ bj + pj ∀j ∈ N+ \ i.
It is straightforward to show that the LICQ is fulfilled for (zi, pi, (xj)j∈N˜ ), thus the KKT condi-
tions are fulfilled. We get the following equations:
−γi − aixi
z2i
∑
j∈N+\i
λj = 0 (5)
xi + µ+
∑
j∈N+\i
λj = 0 (6)
pi + λ+
ai
zi
∑
j∈N+\i
λj = 0 (7)
λ− λj aj
zj
= 0 ∀j ∈ N+ \ i. (8)
We now distinguish between the two cases pi < Ci and pi = Ci.
In the first case, µ = 0 and (6) yields xi = −
∑
j∈N+\i λj . Using this, (5) yields zi =
√
ai
γi
xi.
Plugging this in (7) leads to pi = −λ + aixizi = −λ +
√
aiγi. Using (8), i.e. λj = λ
zj
aj
for all
4In Section 3, we considered fixed strategies s−i, thus we just used (P
1
i ) and (P
2
i ) for the problems corresponding
to s−i. In this section, we need to consider different strategy profiles, thus we now write (P
1
i )(s−i) and
(P2i )(s−i), as well as K
max
i (s−i).
21
j ∈ N+ \ i, together with (6) yields xi = −λ
∑
j∈N+\i
zj
aj
, or equivalently, −λ = xi∑
j∈N+\i
zj
aj
. This
shows pi =
xi∑
j∈N+\i
zj
aj
+
√
aiγi, as required.
The other case is pi = Ci. The formula for zi follows from K =
aixi
zi
+ bi + Ci. Plugging
λj = λ
zj
aj
in (5) and (7) yields
λ =
−γiz2i
aixi
∑
j∈N+\i
zj
aj
and
λ = −Ci − ai
zi
λ ·
∑
j∈N+\i
zj
aj
⇔ λ = −Ci
1 + ai
zi
∑
j∈N+\i
zj
aj
,
which shows the desired equality.
In the next lemma, we introduce two functions Γ1i and Γ
2
i for each firm i and derive useful
properties of these functions.
Lemma 5.2. For each i ∈ N , define
Γ1i : (
√
aiγi + bi,∞)→ R, Γ1i (κ) :=
√
aiγi
κ−√aiγi − bi
and
Γ2i : (bi + Ci,∞)→ R, Γ2i (κ) :=
aiγi
Ci
κ− bi − Ci .
Furthermore, let s = (z, p) be a PNE with x := x(z, p), cost K := K(z, p), and N+ := N+(z, p)
with N+1 := N
+
1 (z, p), N
+
2 := N
+
2 (z, p). Then:
1. Γ1i and Γ
2
i are strictly decreasing functions.
2. If i ∈ N+1 , then Γ1i (K) = 1−
zi
ai∑
j∈N+
zj
aj
< 1.
3. If i ∈ N+2 , then Γ2i (K) = 1−
zi
ai∑
j∈N+
zj
aj
< 1.
4.
∑
i∈N+
1
Γ1i (K) +
∑
i∈N+
2
Γ2i (K) = |N+| − 1.
5. If i ∈ N+1 and there is a (different) PNE s′ = (z′, p′) with i ∈ N+2 (z′, p′), then K < K ′ :=
K(z′, p′) and Γ1i (K) > Γ
2
i (K
′).
Proof. 1. is clear from the definition of Γ1i and Γ
2
i , so turn to 2. and let i ∈ N+1 . Lemma 3.4 yields
zi =
√
ai
γi
xi, pi = K−√aiγi−bi. Using Lemma 5.1, we get K−√aiγi−bi = xi∑
j∈N+\i
zj
aj
+
√
aiγi,
which is equivalent to
K =
xi∑
j∈N+\i
zj
aj
+ 2
√
aiγi + bi.
(Note that pi = Ci is possible (namely if K =
√
aiγi+ bi+Ci), but Lemma 5.1 yields the stated
equality also for this case.) Now define
B :=
∑
j∈N+
zj
aj
.
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Using zi =
√
ai
γi
xi, we now rewrite K as follows:
K =
xi
B − zi
ai
+ 2
√
aiγi + bi
=
xi
B − xi√
aiγi
+ 2
√
aiγi + bi
=
xi + (B − xi√aiγi )
√
aiγi
B − xi√
aiγi
+
√
aiγi + bi
=
B
√
aiγi
B − xi√
aiγi
+
√
aiγi + bi
Using this we get 2.:
Γ1i (K) =
B − xi√
aiγi
B
= 1−
zi
ai
B
< 1.
For 3., let i ∈ N+2 . From Lemma 5.1, we get
Ci
1 + ai
zi
·∑j∈N+\i zjaj =
γiz
2
i
aixi
∑
j∈N+\i
zj
aj
.
Rearranging and using the definition of B yields
aixi
zi
=
γizi(1 +
ai
zi
·∑j∈N+\i zjaj )
Ci ·
∑
j∈N+\i
zj
aj
=
γizi(1 +
ai
zi
· (B − zi
ai
))
Ci · (B − ziai )
=
γiaiB
Ci · (B − ziai )
.
Using K = aixi
zi
+ bi + Ci then yields
K =
γiaiB
Ci · (B − ziai )
+ bi + Ci
and thus 3.:
Γ2i (K) =
B − zi
ai
B
= 1−
zi
ai
B
< 1.
4. now follows from 2. and 3. as follows:∑
i∈N+
1
Γ1i (K) +
∑
i∈N+
2
Γ2i (K) =
∑
i∈N+
1
(
1−
zi
ai
B
)
+
∑
i∈N+
2
(
1−
zi
ai
B
)
=|N+| − 1
B
·
∑
j∈N+
zj
aj
= |N+| − 1.
It remains to show 5.. Let i ∈ N+1 ∩N+2 (z′, p′). Since i ∈ N+1 , in particular the cost K is feasible
for (P1i )(s−i), thus K ≤
√
aiγi + bi + Ci. Similarly, using i ∈ N+2 (z′, p′), the cost K ′ is feasible
for (P2i )(s
′
−i), therefore
√
aiγi + bi + Ci < K
′. Altogether we get K ≤ √aiγi + bi + Ci < K ′.
It remains to show Γ1i (K) > Γ
2
i (K
′). By definition of N+2 (z
′, p′), the cost K ′ is an optimal
solution for problem (P2i )(s
′
−i), and in particular yields a better objective function value than√
aiγi+bi+Ci in (P1i )(s
′
−i) (note that
√
aiγi+bi+Ci is feasible for (P1i )(s
′
−i) since
√
aiγi+bi+Ci <
K ′ < Kmaxi (s
′
−i)). We thus get
xi(
√
aiγi+bi+Ci)(Ci−√aiγi) < xi(K ′)(Ci− aiγi
K ′ − bi − Ci ) ≤ xi(
√
aiγi+bi+Ci)(Ci− aiγi
K ′ − bi − Ci ),
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where the last inequality follows from
√
aiγi + bi + Ci < K
′ and the fact that xi is a decreasing
function. Since xi(
√
aiγi + bi + Ci) > 0, we get
Ci −√aiγi < Ci − aiγi
K ′ − bi − Ci ,
or equivalently √
aiγi >
aiγi
K ′ − bi − Ci ,
which yields √
aiγi
Ci
>
aiγi
Ci
K ′ − bi − Ci = Γ
2
i (K
′).
Note that 2
√
aiγi + bi ≤ K ≤ √aiγi + bi + Ci and thus
1
K −√aiγi − bi ≥
1
Ci
,
which leads to
Γ1i (K) =
√
aiγi
K −√aiγi − bi ≥
√
aiγi
Ci
> Γ2i (K
′),
as desired.
Now we turn to the desired uniqueness of the equilibrium. We start with the following lemma.
Lemma 5.3. For a fixed subset N+ of the firms and a fixed disjoint decomposition N+ =
N+1
.∪N+2 , there is essentially at most one PNE (z, p) such that N+(z, p) = N+, N+1 (z, p) = N+1
and N+2 (z, p) = N
+
2 .
Proof. Assume that there are two PNE (z, p) and (z′, p′) with the described properties, i.e.
N+(z, p) = N+(z′, p′) = N+, N+1 (z, p) = N
+
1 (z
′, p′) = N+1 and N
+
2 (z, p) = N
+
2 (z
′, p′) = N+2 .
Let x := x(z, p) and x′ := x(z′, p′) with costs K := K(z, p) and K ′ := K(z′, p′).
We show that (zi, pi) = (z′i, p
′
i) holds for all i ∈ N+. First note that K = K ′ holds, since
f(κ) :=
∑
i∈N+
1
Γ1i (κ) +
∑
i∈N+
2
Γ2i (κ) is a strictly decreasing function in κ and∑
i∈N+
1
Γ1i (K) +
∑
i∈N+
2
Γ2i (K) = |N+| − 1 =
∑
i∈N+
1
Γ1i (K
′) +
∑
i∈N+
2
Γ2i (K
′)
holds from 4. in Lemma 5.2. This implies pi = p′i for all i ∈ N+, since pi = K −
√
aiγi − bi =
K ′ −√aiγi − bi = p′i holds for i ∈ N+1 , and pi = Ci = p′i for i ∈ N+2 .
If B :=
∑
j∈N+
zj
aj
=
∑
j∈N+
z′j
aj
=: B′ holds, we also get zi = z′i for all i ∈ N+, since 2. of
Lemma 5.2 yields
zi = (1− Γ1i (K))aiB = (1− Γ1i (K ′))aiB′ = z′i
for all i ∈ N+1 and 3. of Lemma 5.2 yields
zi = (1− Γ2i (K))aiB = (1− Γ2i (K ′))aiB′ = z′i
for all i ∈ N+2 . It remains to show B = B′. First consider i ∈ N+1 . Using zi =
√
ai/γi · xi and
z′i =
√
ai/γi · x′i, as well as 2. of Lemma 5.2, yields
xi/B = (1− Γ1i (K))
√
aiγi = (1− Γ1i (K ′))
√
aiγi = x
′
i/B
′.
For i ∈ N+2 , we use ziai =
xi
K−bi−Ci and
z′i
ai
=
x′i
K ′−bi−Ci and 3. of Lemma 5.2 to achieve
xi/B = (1− Γ2i (K))(K − bi − Ci) = (1− Γ2i (K ′))(K ′ − bi − Ci) = x′i/B′.
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Summing over all firms i ∈ N+ yields B = B′, as desired:
1
B
=
∑
i∈N+
xi
B
=
∑
i∈N+
1
(
(1− Γ1i (K))
√
aiγi
)
+
∑
i∈N+
2
(
(1− Γ2i (K))(K − bi − Ci)
)
=
∑
i∈N+
1
(
(1− Γ1i (K ′))
√
aiγi
)
+
∑
i∈N+
2
(
(1− Γ2i (K ′))(K ′ − bi − Ci)
)
=
∑
i∈N+
x′i
B′
=
1
B′
.
In the previous lemma, we showed that given a fixed subset N+ ⊆ N and a fixed disjoint
decomposition N+ = N+1
.∪ N+2 , there is at most one PNE (z, p) such that N+(z, p) = N+,
N+1 (z, p) = N
+
1 and N
+
2 (z, p) = N
+
2 . Next, we strengthen this result by showing that for a fixed
subset N+ ⊆ N , there is at most one PNE (z, p) with N+(z, p) = N+ (independently of the
decomposition of N+).
Lemma 5.4. For a fixed subset N+ of the firms, there is essentially at most one PNE (z, p)
with N+(z, p) = N+.
Proof. Assume, by contradiction, that there are different PNE (z, p) and (z, p) with N+(z, p) =
N+ = N+(z, p). Let N+1 := N
+
1 (z, p), N
+
2 := N
+
2 (z, p) and N
+
1 := N
+
1 (z, p), N
+
2 := N
+
2 (z, p).
Further denote x := x(z, p), K := K(z, p) and x := x(z, p), K := K(z, p).
Lemma 5.3 yields that the decompositions of N+ have to be different. Without loss of gen-
erality, there is a firm j ∈ N+1 \ N
+
1 . Since j ∈ N+2 , 5. of Lemma 5.2 yields K < K. By the
same argumentation, the existence of a firm i ∈ N+1 \ N+1 leads to the contradiction K < K,
thus N
+
1 ( N
+
1 and N
+
2 ( N
+
2 holds and we can write (using 4. of Lemma 5.2)
|N+| − 1 =
∑
i∈N+
1
Γ1i (K) +
∑
i∈N+
2
Γ2i (K) =
∑
i∈N+
1
\N+1
Γ1i (K) +
∑
i∈N+1
Γ1i (K) +
∑
i∈N+
2
Γ2i (K)
and
|N+| − 1 =
∑
i∈N+1
Γ1i (K) +
∑
i∈N+2
Γ2i (K) =
∑
i∈N+1
Γ1i (K) +
∑
i∈N+2 \N+2
Γ2i (K) +
∑
i∈N+
2
Γ2i (K).
Using that K < K and
∑
i∈N+
2
Γ2i (κ) is a strictly decreasing function in κ yields∑
i∈N+
2
Γ2i (K) ≥
∑
i∈N+
2
Γ2i (K).
Furthermore,
∑
i∈N+1
Γ1i (κ) is also strictly decreasing in κ, thus∑
i∈N+1
Γ1i (K) ≥
∑
i∈N+1
Γ1i (K).
Finally, 5. of Lemma 5.2 yields Γ1i (K) > Γ
2
i (K) for all i ∈ N+1 \N
+
1 = N
+
2 \N+2 6= ∅, thus∑
i∈N+
1
\N+1
Γ1i (K) >
∑
i∈N+2 \N+2
Γ2i (K).
Altogether we get the contradiction
|N+| − 1 =
∑
i∈N+
1
\N+1
Γ1i (K) +
∑
i∈N+1
Γ1i (K) +
∑
i∈N+
2
Γ2i (K)
>
∑
i∈N+1
Γ1i (K) +
∑
i∈N+2 \N+2
Γ2i (K) +
∑
i∈N+
2
Γ2i (K)
=|N+| − 1,
completing the proof.
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For the uniqueness of the PNE, it remains to show that there is at most one set N+ such that
a PNE (z, p) with N+(z, p) = N+ exists. To this end, we first show that each firm i has a certain
threshold K∗i such that, for any PNE (z, p), firm i has zi > 0 if and only if K(z, p) > K
∗
i .
Lemma 5.5. For each i ∈ N , define
K∗i :=
{
aiγi
Ci
+ bi + Ci, if
√
aiγi > Ci,
2
√
aiγi + bi, else.
Then, for any PNE s = (z, p) and any firm i ∈ N , it holds that zi > 0 if and only if K(z, p) > K∗i .
Proof. Let s = (z, p) be a PNE with K := K(z, p) and i ∈ N .
First assume that zi = 0. Since (z, p) is a PNE, the strategy (zi, pi) = (0, pi) is a best response
for firm i to s−i. As we have seen in Theorem 3.6, this is equivalent to the fact that both problems
(P1i )(s−i) and (P
2
i )(s−i) are infeasible. Note that K = Kmaxi (s−i) holds. To show K ≤ K∗i , we
have to distinguish between the two cases
√
aiγi > Ci and
√
aiγi ≤ Ci. First consider√aiγi > Ci,
thusK∗i = aiγi/Ci+bi+Ci. Since (P
2
i )(s−i) is infeasible and
√
aiγi+bi+Ci < aiγi/Ci+bi+Ci, we
get the desired inequality K = Kmaxi (s−i) ≤ aiγi/Ci + bi + Ci = K∗i . Now consider
√
aiγi ≤ Ci,
i.e. K∗i = 2
√
aiγi + bi. Since (P1i )(s−i) is infeasible and 2
√
aiγi + bi ≤ √aiγi + bi + Ci, we get
K = Kmaxi (s−i) ≤ 2
√
aiγi + bi = K
∗
i , as desired. We have seen that zi = 0 implies K ≤ K∗i , or,
equivalently, K > K∗i implies zi > 0.
It remains to show the other direction, i.e. zi > 0 implies K > K∗i . We consider the two cases√
aiγi > Ci and
√
aiγi ≤ Ci and use our results from Lemma 3.4 and Theorem 3.6. If√aiγi > Ci,
thus K∗i =
aiγi
Ci
+ bi + Ci, the cost K is an optimal solution for problem (P
2
i )(s−i) with positive
objective function value (note that (P1i )(s−i) is infeasible), therefore K∗i =
aiγi
Ci
+ bi + Ci < K.
In the second case, i.e.
√
aiγi ≤ Ci and K∗i = 2
√
aiγi + bi, the cost K either is optimal for
(P1i )(s−i), or optimal for (P
2
i )(s−i), and has positive objective function value in both subcases.
We get the desired property, since K∗i = 2
√
aiγi + bi < K holds for the first subcase, and
K∗i = 2
√
aiγi + bi ≤ √aiγi + bi + Ci < K for the second subcase, completing the proof.
Lemma 5.6. There is at most one subset N+ of the firms such that a PNE (z, p) with N+(z, p) =
N+ exists.
Proof. Assume, by contradiction, that there are two different subsets N+ und N
+
with cor-
responding PNE (z, p) and (z, p). Denote x := x(z, p), K := K(z, p) and x := x(z, p),
K := K(z, p). Using Lemma 5.5, we can assume without loss of generality that K < K and
N+ ( N
+
. Let N+1
.∪N+2 and N
+
1
.∪N+2 be the decompositions of N+ and N+.
First note that N+2 ⊆ N
+
2 holds, since the existence of a firm i ∈ N+2 \N
+
2 , i.e. i ∈ N+2 ∩N
+
1 ,
leads to the contradiction K < K by 5. of Lemma 5.2. Second, if there is a firm i ∈ N+1 \N
+
1 ,
i.e. i ∈ N+1 ∩ N
+
2 , 5. of Lemma 5.2 yields Γ
1
i (K) > Γ
2
i (K). Finally, Γ
1
i (K) < 1 holds for all
i ∈ N+1 , and Γ2i (K) < 1 holds for all i ∈ N
+
2 (see 2. and 3. of Lemma 5.2). This now leads
to the following contradiction, completing the proof (where we additionally use K < K and 1.
and 4. of Lemma 5.2):
|N+| − 1 =
∑
i∈N+1
Γ1i (K) +
∑
i∈N+2
Γ2i (K)
=
∑
i∈N+1 ∩N+1
Γ1i (K) +
∑
i∈N+1 \N+
Γ1i (K) +
∑
i∈N+2 ∩N+1
Γ2i (K) +
∑
i∈N+
2
Γ2i (K) +
∑
i∈N+2 \N+
Γ2i (K)
<
∑
i∈N+
1
∩N+1
Γ1i (K) +
∑
i∈N+
1
∩N+2
Γ1i (K) +
∑
i∈N+
2
Γ2i (K) + |N+| − |N+|
=
∑
i∈N+
1
Γ1i (K) +
∑
i∈N+
2
Γ2i (K) + |N+| − |N+| = |N+| − 1 + |N+| − |N+| = |N+| − 1.
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Together with the existence result in Theorem 4.6, the preceeding Lemmata 5.4 and 5.6 show
that there is exactly one PNE:
Theorem 5.7. Every capacity and price competition game has an essentially unique pure Nash
equilibrium, i.e. if (z, p) and (z′, p′) are two different PNE and i ∈ N is a firm such that
(zi, pi) 6= (z′i, p′i), then zi = z′i = 0 holds.
6 Quality of Equilibria
In the last section, we showed that a capacity and price competition game has a (essentially)
unique PNE. Now we show that this PNE can be arbitrarily inefficient compared to a social
optimum. Define the social cost C(z, p) of a strategy profile s = (z, p) as
C(z, p) =
{∑
i∈{1,...,n}:zi>0 (ℓi(xi(s), zi)xi(s) + γizi), if
∑n
i=1 zi > 0,
∞, else.
The function C(z, p) measures utilitarian social welfare over firms and customers (the price
component cancels out). Common notions to measure the quality of equilibria are the Price of
Anarchy (PoA) and the Price of Stability (PoS), which are defined as the worst case ratios of the
cost of a worst, respectively best, pure Nash equilibrium, and a social optimum. Since equilibria
are unique in our game, this simplifies to
PoA = PoS := sup
G
C(PNE(G))
OPT(G)
,
where PNE(G) denotes the unique PNE of the capacity and price competition game G and
OPT(G) denotes the minimum social cost in G (compared to all possible strategy profiles). Note
that OPT(G) is the solution value of the classical bilevel network design optimization problem
(see [11, 24]). The following theorem shows that PoA and PoS are unbounded:
Theorem 6.1. PoA = PoS =∞. The bound is attained even for games with only two firms.
Proof. Consider the capacity and price competition game GM with n = 2 and a1 = γ1 =
C1 = 1, b1 = 0 and a2 = γ2 = C2 = M, b2 = 0, where M ≥ 1.
By z1 = 1, p1 = z2 = p2 = 0, we get a solution with social cost 2, so OPT(GM ) ≤ 2. We will
now show that C(PNE(GM )) > M holds, thus
PoS = PoA ≥ C(PNE(GM ))
OPT(GM )
>
M
2
.
By M → ∞, this yields the desired result. It remains to show C(PNE(GM )) > M . For fixed
M ≥ 1, let s = (z, p) be the unique PNE of GM with induced Wardrop-flow x := x(s) and cost
K := K(s). Note that zi > 0 holds for i = 1, 2 since any PNE has at least two positive capacities.
Lemma 3.4 together with Theorem 3.6 yields that, for each firm i ∈ {1, 2}, the cost K either
is optimal for (P1i )(s−i), or optimal for (P
2
i )(s−i), and has positive objective function value in
both cases. Since, for each firm i ∈ {1, 2}, the only candidate for a feasible solution of (P1i )(s−i)
is 2
√
aiγi + bi =
√
aiγi + bi + Ci and this yields an objective function value of 0, we get that
K is an optimal solution of (P2i )(s−i). In particular this yields, by considering firm 2, that
2M =
√
a2γ2 + b2 + C2 < K. We furthermore get p1 = C1 = 1 and p2 = C2 = M . Using that
ℓi(xi, zi) + pi = K for i = 1, 2, the desired inequality for C(s) = C(PNE(GM )) follows:
C(PNE(GM )) = ℓ1(x1, z1)x1 + z1 + ℓ2(x2, z2)x2 +Mz2 > ℓ1(x1, z1)x1 + ℓ2(x2, z2)x2
= (K − p1)x1 + (K − p2)(1− x1) = (K − 1)x1 + (K −M)(1− x1)
≥ K −M > 2M −M = M.
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